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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates the effect of the legal institutional factors on entry mode 
selection in outward FDI. Outward FDI by US firms in 48 countries around the 
world is studied. Entry mode of outward FDI is decomposed into investment mode 
selection and ownership proportion selection. The investment mode selection is 
made between partial acquisition and joint venture. Evidence indicates that US firms 
tend to adopt partial acquisition in a country with better legal institutions. The 
ownership proportion selection is studied with the samples of 1) partial and full 
acquisitions and 2) joint ventures. Evidence shows that US firms tend to own larger 
proportions of shares in the acquired firms in a country with better legal institutions in 
a sample of partial and full acquisitions while there is no much evidence in the sample 
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The choice of foreign entry modes by firms entering another country has been a 
popular topic in the theoretical and especially empirical research in economics. 
When discussing the foreign direct investment (FDI) entry strategy, most of the 
existing literature focuses on a binary choice between wholly owned enterprises 
(WOEs) and equity joint ventures (EJVs) or between greenfield investment and 
acquisition' (Wei, Liu and Liu 2004). 
When a firm plans to invest abroad, it has to make choices in some aspects. 
Firstly, it has to choose a country for it to make foreign direct investment. After it 
chooses a country, the second question is whether the firm wants to be the sole owner 
or a co-owner with the firms in the host country. If it chooses to be the sole owner in 
the host country, the firm can choose to set up a wholly owned enterprise (WOE) or 
acquire 100% of the shares of an existing firm in the host country. If it chooses to be 
a co-owner in the host country, then the firm can set up a joint venture (JV) or simply 
buy a portion of the shares of an existing firm. 
‘Acquisition is also known as M&A. The two terms are used inter-changeably in this thesis. 
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The flow chart of the choices by the firm in this illustrated case is like this: 
Firm planning to invest abroad 
Sole owner of the foreign invested entity Co-owner of the foreign invested entity 
⑴ (2) 
Buy an existing Set up a WOE Buy a portion of . Set up a 
foreign firm an existing firm JV with 
(100% acquisition) (< 100% acquisition) foreign firms 
(3) ‘ (4) (5) (6) 
Roughly speaking, when a firm chooses to be the sole owner of the foreign entity, 
there are differences between choosing (3) and (4). In choosing (3), despite the 
100% ownership of the entity, the firm cannot freely get the entity under control. It 
is because this only involves a change in ownership, the enterprise culture remains 
unchanged in short run. By contrast, the firm can better control the entity if 
choosing (4), that is, to set up a WOE. When a firm chooses to be the co-owner of 
the entity, the new entity will have a new enterprise culture that is the combined result 
of the two or more owner firms' if the firm chooses (6). However, the enterprise 
culture stays the same in the short run if the firm chooses to enter the host country 
through (5), that is, simply to buy a portion of an existing entity. Within partial 
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acquisition, majority acquisition and minority acquisition will also make a difference 
in which the legal determinants are investigated in this thesis. In fact, we can view 
the issue from other ways. We can consider the firm to be choosing the investment 
modes—mergers and acquisitions (M&A) or greenfield start-ups (GSU) first. Then 
the firm faces the second choice of partial ownership or full ownership. 
Purpose 
In this research, we would like to decompose the choice of entry modes into 
investment mode choice (M&A or GSU) and ownership proportion choice. We 
would like to investigate the investment mode choice and ownership proportion 
choice when an US firm invests abroad from a legal point of view. Choosing the 
United States of America (US) as the home country is representative and reasonable 
since the US is the largest economy. As the legal system and the laws are always the 
first few things a firm needs to consider when investing abroad, investigating the issue 
from the legal point of view is doubtlessly meaningful. 
The objective of this thesis is to investigate whether the legal institutional factors 
in the target countries have an influence on the investment mode choice and 
ownership proportion choice by the US firms. Through investigating the US 
outward FDI in the 48 countries around the world, we may have some insights on 




The organization of this study is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents the 
literature review. The following chapter describes the methodology, data collection 
and data processing. Chapter 4 investigates the empirical evidence of the effects of 
the legal factors on the investment mode selection. Chapter 5 studies the empirical 
evidence of the legal factors on the ownership concentration choice. The discussion 
and conclusion are given in the Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
REVIEW OF THEORIES AND LITERATURE 
The Literature on Foreign Direct Investment 
Through international expansion, multinational enterprises get penetrated into 
foreign countries. In different entry modes, the core competency contributions, 
control over subsidiaries, parent-subsidy relations, and vulnerability to external 
changes in a host country vary from one to another (Gomes-Casseres, 1990; Hill et al.， 
1990; Root, 1994). In recent years, there came out different models for entry mode 
selection, namely, Dunning’s OLI paradigm, transaction cost theory, bargaining power 
theory and the organizational capability paradigm. The four theories altogether have 
a greater explanatory power than any single one in investigating the underlying 
principles and ideas behind the entry mode selection. 
Dunnin^'s OJJ Paradip^m 
Dunning's (1980，1988) OLI paradigm suggested that the choice of entry mode 
was influenced by three types of determinants, namely, ownership advantages of the 
firm, locational advantages of the market, and internalization advantages of 
integrating transactions within the firm. Once an MNE's technological, operational, 
organizational, and the financial competencies are strong enough, it may choose the 
riskier entry mode since it always provide a greater potential for higher returns 
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(ownership advantages). Host country factors, especially contextual uncertainties, 
market opportunities and the governmental policies always have a substantial impact 
on entry mode selection (locational advantages). Low control entry modes are 
considered superior for certain transactions since they allow a firm to benefit from the 
scale of economies of the marketplace (Williamson, 1985). However, costs may be 
higher if the managers of the target firms fail to manage the firms well. Therefore, 
when high integration is needed, high control entry modes are preferred 
(internalization advantages). 
Transaction Cost Theory 
Transaction costs refer to the costs of transacting business with other parties in 
the market, such as costs of drafting and negotiating contracts and monitoring the 
behavior of those who enter into the contracts (Luo, 2001). This theory suggests that 
an MNE chooses a governance structure to minimize transaction costs (Anderson and 
Gatignon, 1986; Hennart, 1989; Williamson, 1985). If costs of adaptation, 
performance monitoring, and safeguarding against opportunistic behavior are too high, 
the firm prefers wholly owned subsidiary (Luo, 2001). According to this theory, if 
transaction costs, are high, MNEs may choose a high control mode (Hill et al., 1990; 
Madhok, 1997). A high control mode may be chosen if the uncertainty of demand 
for an MNE's products or services in a foreign market is high (Luo, 2001). 
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Barsainins Power Theory 
Bargaining power theory argues that the relative bargaining power of the firm 
and that of the foreign government determine the entry mode chosen by an MNE 
(Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994). Strong bargaining power means the bargainer has a 
higher ability to set discussion parameters, win comprises from the other party, and 
skew the outcome of negotiations towards its ownership alternatives (Luo, 2001). 
Bargaining power theory assumes that typically MNEs prefer high control mode as 
they can better dominate the market and protect proprietary technology. On the 
contrary, the foreign governments prefer the MNEs to adopt low control mode as it 
facilitates the transfer of technology and know-how to local firms and allow the local 
firms to share the success of the FDI projects (Gomes-Casseres, 1990). From the 
literature, we see that a high control mode is selected when the host government 
strongly desires to attract FDI; the MNE perceives its need to enter the foreign market 
as low; the host government imposes limited restrictions on FDI and the risks 
including both political and economic ones are high (Luo, 2001). 
Orsanizational Capability 
In today's environment, MNEs feel they cannot remain competitive enough if 
relying on their own capacities only. They therefore perceive a stronger need to 
reinforce their competitiveness through collaboration (Madlock, 1997). 
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Collaboration is then considered to be a mode of knowledge acquisition. Firms 
desiring to enhance the capabilities of their core businesses find joint ventures 
attractive while FDI made through a wholly owned subsidiary results in the 
perpetuation of a firm's routines (Luo, 2001). 
OLI paradigm provides insights into the advantages and benefits of the firms. 
Transaction cost theory discusses the costs of various entry modes. Bargaining 
power theory describes the relative strengths of the parties. Organizational 
capability paradigm rests on the firms' perception of the necessity of acquisition to 
remain competitive. The above four theories serve as the theoretical foundation in 
the study of FDI entry modes. 
There are researches focusing on the binary choice between a WOE and a JV (e.g. 
Henmart and Larimo, 1998; Markina and Neupert, 2000) or between acquisition or 
greenfield investment (e.g. Chang and Rosenzweig; 2001; Girma, 2002). In the 
literature, most of the empirical studies on the binary choice between a WOE and a JV 
are based on the OLI paradigm and transaction cost theory. In particular, transaction 
cost theory has been very useful in explaining investment mode choice and ownership 
proportion choice. 
WOE versus JV 
With respect to ownership proportion, it has been hypothesized that the higher 
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the proprietary content of intangible assets, such as technology or brand loyalty, the 
higher chances for a firm to choose full ownership rather than partial ownership. 
Empirical studies showed that entry by full ownership is positively related to 
intangible assets, R&D intensity and advertising intensity (Hennart, 1982; Anderson 
and Gatignon, 1986; Gatignon and Anderson, 1988). Wei, Liu and Liu (2004) 
suggested that MNE's choice of the WOE mode is positively related with its large 
investment commitment, the host-country experience in attracting FDI, a good 
industrial location, and a high asset intensity in the host country. If the host-country 
experience and good industrial location are not met, JV will be preferred (Wei, Liu 
and Liu, 2004). 
Acquisition versus Greenfield Investment 
Regarding the choice between acquisition and greenfield investment, transaction 
cost theory stresses the distinction between exploiting existing resources and 
acquiring new resources. When firms prefer to retain their superior organizational 
and technical expertise, they always adopt greenfield investment as the investment 
mode. Hennart and Park (1993) demonstrated that the greater R&D intensity 
increases the likelihood of entry by greenfield investment rather than M&A using data 
on Japanese FDI in the US. By contrast, firms seeking to acquire general knowledge 
of the local economy or product-specific knowledge that resides in local firms prefer 
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M&A. Empirical findings supported this view, for example, when Japanese firms 
enter into new lines of business, they prefer M&A to greenfield investment (Hennart, 
1991; Hennart and Park, 1993) 
Pan, Tao and Lu (2003) demonstrated that firms with a strong expertise in 
acquisitions relative to greenfield operations are more likely to engage in future 
acquisitions; location-specific knowledge (first entry) is negatively related with the 
choice of acquisitions; firms are more likely to acquire Chinese firms that shared a 
high level of product relatedness. They also show the peer effect from the firms. 
They found that the greater number of acquisitions by all foreign firms in China in the 
particular product sector is in the previous year, the more likely firms are to choose 
acquisition in entering China. In addition, they demonstrated that firms from 
high-avoidance countries perceived the risk associated with acquisitions as high, and 
tried to avoid acquisitions as entry mode. 
The Literature on Legal Issues 
•A 
As this paper investigates the issue from the legal point of view, some literatures 
involving studies of legal system, enforcement of law, shareholder protection, legal 




Firstly, the legal system of a country defines the rules of game the decision 
makers need to follow. For FDI purpose, commercial laws are important for the 
firms. Legal scholars show that commercial legal systems of most countries derive 
from relatively few legal 'families' (David and Brierly; 1985), including the English 
common law, the French and the German civil law, the latter two derived from Roman 
law. In general, there are two traditions the commercial laws come from, that are 
common law and civil law. Legal rules of civil law countries are actually derived 
from Roman law, and "are conceived as rules of conduct intimately linked to ideas of 
justice and morality" (David and Brierley, 1985, p.22). Common law comes from 
Britain. It was "formed primarily by judges who tried to resolve specific disputes" 
(David and Brierley, 1985, p.24). The differences between common law and civil 
law have been pointed out by Zweigert and Kotz (1987): "The tradition of the English 
common law has been of gradual development from decision to decision: historically 
speaking, it is case law, not enacted law. On the Continent, the development since 
the reception of Roman law has been quite different, from the interpretation of the 
Justinian's Corpus luris to the codification, nation by nation, of abstract rules. So 
common law comes from the court, Continent Law from the study; the great jurists of 
England were judges, on the Continent professors. On the Continent lawyers, faced 
with a problem, even a new and unforeseen one, ask what solution the rule provides, 
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in England and the United States they predict how the judge would deal with the 
problem, given existing decisions. These differences in style run through the whole 
system. On the Continent lawyers think abstractly, in terms of institutions, in 
England concretely, in terms of cases, the relationship of the parties, 'rights and 
duties'. On the Continent, the system is conceived as being complete and free from 
gaps, in England lawyers feel their way gradually case to case. On the Continent 
lawyers delight in systematics, in England they are skeptical of every generalization. 
On the Continent lawyers operate with ideas which often, dangerously enough, take 
on a life of their own, in England they think in pictures; and so one could continue." 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) said that legal origins 
play a central role in determining investor protection. They showed that countries 
with common law as the legal origin provide better protection for minority 
shareholders than do countries with civil law as the legal origin. La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1999) found that civil law countries, 
especially French civil law countries, are more interventionist than common law 
countries. This general phenomenon may be explained by the inferior protection of 
the rights of outside investors in civil law countries. Gomes-Casseres (1990) argued 
that when government intervention into venture operations in a host country is likely 
to be high, cooperative entry mode is more valuable to MNEs. This is to limit the 
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exposure by reducing resource commitment and increasing its ability to exit from the 
market quickly without taking a substantial loss should the environment worsen. 
Beamish and Banks (1987) suggested that the cooperative mode is attractive as local 
equity partners may have some influence on host government policies, along with a 
vested interest in speaking out against intervention. Luo (1997) suggested that local 
partners could utilize their knowledge, experience and business networks to cultivate 
a better relationship with government authorities. He also argued that such 
relationship is even more important than legal standards and impartial justice systems. 
Enforcement of Law 
Secondly, enforcement of law is of equal importance as the legal rules 
themselves. System of legal enforcement and legal rules are substitutes in some 
sense. A strong system of legal enforcement can even substitute for weak rules, 
because the active and well-functioning courts can help step in and rescue investors 
abused by management as suggested by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1998). Five measures were used in their studies: efficiency of the judicial 
systems, rule of law, corruption, risk of expropriation and likelihood of contract 
repudiation by the government. However, they did not find the conclusion that the 
quality of law enforcement compensates for the quality of laws. The enforcement of 
law by the regulators and courts is an essential element of corporate governance and 
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finance (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997, 1998). In most 
countries, laws and regulations are enforced in part by market regulators, in part by 
courts, and in part by market participants themselves. However, the enforcement of 
private contracts through the court system is costly enough, other forms of protection, 
for example, judicially-enforced laws and even government-enforced regulations, may 
be more efficient (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 2000). They 
also show evidence to reject the hypothesis that private contracting is sufficient. 
Shareholder Protection 
After reviewing some literature concerning the legal system and the enforcement 
of law, we can see that they actually have an effect on the choices of entry modes 
through the investor protection function implicitly. Investor protection is in fact 
specified explicitly in laws in most countries. Investor protection can be broadly 
divided into shareholder protection and creditor protection. As this paper focuses on 
selection of entry modes in foreign direct investment, shareholder protection will be 
reviewed in detail. Shareholder protection is important because in many countries, 
expropriation of minority shareholders by the controlling shareholders or corporate 
management is extensive. It makes the investment, especially FDI in other countries 
risky. Shareholder protection can be thought to be means of making the 
expropriation technology less efficient (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and 
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Vishny, 2000). They also argued that as the expropriation technology becomes less 
efficient, the insiders expropriate less, and their private benefits of control diminish. 
The shareholder protection law can shape the expropriation technology, which in turn 
shape the opportunities for FDI. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1998) used three variables for measuring shareholder protection, namely, 
one-share-one-vote rule, anti-director right and mandatory dividend right. Better 
shareholder protection reduces the cost of raising external equity, thereby increasing 
M&A activities. Rossi and Volpin (2003) showed that more M&As were associated 
with better shareholder protection. The effect of shareholder protection on the entry 
mode choice will be further investigated in this research. 
Accountins Standard 
Accounting standard in a country is defined and regulated by law. Accounting 
standard measures the quality of the disclosure of accounting information (Rossi and 
Volpin, 2003). Rossi and Volpin (2003) showed that better accounting standard was 
positively and significantly correlated with M&A activities. In this research, 
accounting standard will be considered to be one of the determinants in the selection 
of entry modes. 
Other Lesal Issues 
2 The anti-director rights is a summary index for 1) proxy by mail, 2) shares blocked before meeting, 3) 
cumulative voting, 4) oppressed minority mechanism, 5) percentage of share capital to call an 
extraordinary shareholders' meeting 
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There are some other factors affecting the legal environment perceived by the 
foreign investors. With reference to Rossi and Volpin (2003), mandatory bid rule 
and cross-border regulation are considered in my research. Mandatory bid rule is 
said to be practiced if acquirers are forced to make a tender offer to all shareholders 
when passing a given ownership threshold. Empirically, it reduces the volume of 
M&A activity as it imposes further costs to the potential bidder (Rossi and Volpin, 
2003). Cross-border regulation is said to be imposed if a foreign buyer needs 
government approval before acquiring control of a domestic firm. Rossi and Volpin 





The sample for this thesis came from the database called the Worldwide Mergers 
& Acquisitions，and Alliances, produced by Securities Data Company (SDC Platinum). 
This database has been widely used in M&A studies (e.g., Graham, Lemmon, & Wolf, 
2002 and Pan, Tao and Lu, 2003). The database contains details of more than 1.8 
million mergers and acquisitions and 75000 joint ventures worldwide. We selected 
those cases in which US firms are the acquiring firms in M&A cases and partner firms 
in joint venture cases respectively. 
Our initial sample contains all mergers and acquisitions and joint ventures 
involving US as the acquiring country (M&A) or the partner country (JV) announced 
between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 2003, completed as of December 31, 
2003. Since SDC Platinum database does not provide all the financial variables we 
need in the study, we also collect some data from WorldScope, a database from 
Thompson Financial. For other industry-level and country-level control variables, 
we collect them from various other sources. Because of the disclosure biases as 
pointed out by Rossi and Volpin (2003), it is very important to be aware that the 
availability and the quality of the data may be better in some countries such as UK 
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due to broader SDC coverage. 
Table 1 describes the variables we use in this thesis and indicates the sources. 
These variables can be classified into country-level, industry-level and firm-level. 
(Insert Table 1 here) 
The country-level variables include all legal institutional variables. This set of 
variables can be classified into different groups, namely, legal origins, shareholder 
protection, government enforcement efficiency, securities regulation, corporate 
transparency, and other legal issues of the 48 countries around the world. 
(Insert Table 2 here) 
(Insert Table 3 here) 
(Insert Table 4 here) 
The country-level variables also include one set of control variables which are 
the logarithm of GDP and external market capitalization/GDP. The logarithm of 
GDP controls for the size of economy of a country and the external market 
capitalization/GDP controls for the degree of the development of stock market of a 
country. A more developed equity market facilitates the acquisition. 
Another set of variables controls for the cultural and regional proximity. 
Language and religious faith are used to control for the cultural proximity. The 
variables include the dummy variable for English-speaking country, the dummy 
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variable for Christianity (Protestants) and the dummy variable for Christianity 
(non-Protestants). For the regional proximity, dummy variable for the same region, 
dummy variable for Europe, dummy variable for Asia, dummy variable for Africa and 
the dummy variable for Australia are used. 
Some countries reported particularly large number of M&A or JV transactions, 
Canada was the target country which had the largest number of M&A transactions 
while UK had the second largest number. Japan was the target country which had 
the largest number of JV transactions. We control for these countries in the 
investigation of ownership proportion decision. 
The industry-level variables include those variables relevant to the firm's 
industry. Some industries report particularly large number of M&A or JV 
transactions. For M&A transactions, business services industry reports the largest 
number of M&A transactions while oil, gas and petroleum refining reports the second 
largest number. For JV transactions, information retrieval services industry reports 
the largest number of JV transactions while prepackaged software industry reports the 
second largest number. We control for these industries in the study of ownership 
proportion selection in order to achieve a fair investigation. 
The firm-level variables include the firm characteristic variables. These 
variables include the financial variables describing the financial conditions of the 
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target firms and the non-fmancial variables. The financial variables used in this 
study include target firm's total asset, target firm's financial leverage, target firm's 
market-to-book ratio, target firm's return on asset and target firm's price-earnings 
ratio. The non-fmancial variables include the number of product segments of the 
target firm and whether the target firm and the investing firm are in the same industry. 
Since the main aim of this paper is to investigate the effect of the legal factors on 
outward FDI，these firm characteristic variables are added to control for firm 
characteristics. 
Precisely speaking, the first set of variables, that is, the country-level variables is 
of our great interest in this research (except for logarithm of GDP and external 
capitalization/GDP). The second and third sets of variables are mainly used as 
control variables. We are going to discuss the justification of the financial and 
industry control variables in detail. 
Control Variables in Detail 
In this thesis, legal variables are used in explaining different aspects of outward 
FDI. Adopting legal approach in M&A studies is a new research area. In the past 
studies of mergers and acquisitions, the characteristics of firms always draw 
considerable attention in determining the M&A targets. In order to investigate how 
the outward FDI decision depends on the legal variables, we need to include some 
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firm-level variables that were shown to be significant in explaining outward FDI 
decision in literature. Control variables can be classified into financial ones and 
non-financial ones. The firm-level financial control variables used in this thesis are 
target firm's total asset, target firm's financial leverage, target firm's market-to-book 
ratio, target firm's return on asset and target firm's price-earnings ratio. The 
non-financial control variables are number of product segments of target and dummy 
for same sic of the target with the US firm. 
Financial Control Variables 
Total Asset of the Target Firm 
Size hypothesis explored by Palepu (1986) submits that larger firms are less 
likely to become acquisition targets due to the higher costs of absorbing larger targets 
into the acquiring firms' organizational structures. It is also due to the possibility of 
larger firms to engage in more prolonged and costly takeover defenses. The book 
value of total assets serves as the proxy for the firm size. The firm size is 
hypothesized to be negatively related with the M&A activities. The relationship has 
been confirmed by Hasbrouck (1985), Palepu (1986), Shleifer and Vishny (1988)， 
Mikkelson and Partch (1989), Ambrose and Megginson (1992), Song and Walkling 
(1993), Berger and Ofek (1996) and Barnes (1999). Firms with large sizes may 
induce the US firms to set up JV with them in which the US firms and the targets both 
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inject some of their ‘essence’ into the JV instead of acquiring a large of part of 
unrelated departments in the targets. 
Financial Leverage of the Target Firm 
US firms are reluctant to acquire the targets with high financial leverage as they 
are afraid of bearing higher financial risk. When a firm is highly leveraged, the 
acquiring firm will bear a large debt burden after acquisition, therefore, high financial 
leverage may potentially deter acquisition. Debt level may also reflect a specific 
degree of monitoring ability (Akhigbe, Madura and Spencer, 2004). Targets with 
low levels of debt may be considered to be under-monitored (Jensen, 1986). The 
introduction of a large corporate shareholder should have a beneficial effect on the 
monitoring and thus improving the performance of the targets (Akhigbe, Madura and 
Spencer, 2004). The performance of targets following the partial acquisitions is 
expected to be negatively related to the targets' degree of leverage. McConnell and 
Servaes (1990) showed that high growth companies are badly affected by high debt 
levels while in slow growth companies, performance improves with a high amount of 
debt. It follows that financial leverage is represented by the interaction between the 
debt ratio and growth opportunities. Akhigbe, Madura and Spencer (2004) showed 
that financial leverage variable is negatively and significantly related to the 
performance (measured by initial share price response). Although the direction of 
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the effect of financial leverage on the M&A decision remains an empirical question, 
the inclusion of financial leverage is meaningful. 
Market-to-book Ratio of the Target Firm 
Palepu (1986) proposed the market-to-book ratio hypothesis and argued that 
firms with low market-to-book ratios are viewed as undervalued and attractive for 
takeovers. The market-to-book ratio may be interpreted in a number of ways (Weir 
and Laing, 2003). First, a low ratio may mean the firms are regarded as having poor 
growth prospects by the capital market. Second, lower market-to-book ratio may 
demonstrate that the target is a good bargain and attracts a bid by the acquirer (Powell, 
1997). Powell (1997) found no difference in the market-to-book ratios of the 
friendly takeovers and non-acquired firms. Dahya and Powell (1999) showed that 
the market-to-book ratios of the targets of friendly acquisitions are no different from 
those of hostile takeovers. Weir and Laing (2003) found that acquired firms had 
significantly lower market-to-book ratio. Being an important firm characteristic 
factor, market-to-book ratio is included in our research as control. 
Return on Asset of the Target Firm 
According to the inefficient management hypothesis (Palepu, 1986)，acquisitions 
of firms could be motivated by the potential gains that should accrue when the 
inefficient managers of the acquired firms are replaced. The theory of the market for 
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corporate control (Manne, 1965) indicates that when a firm is managed inefficiently, 
there will be other management teams willing to take control of that firm, replacing 
the old management and improving it. Return on asset was considered to be one of 
the indicators of the efficiency of a firm with which it is being managed. The firms 
with lower return on asset are hypothesized to have a higher probability of being the 
object of a takeover bid (Alcalde and Espitia, 2003). North (2001) found that the 
return on asset does not affect the probability of acquisition. Franks and Mayer 
(1996) found no difference in the return to capital of friendly takeover and 
non-acquired firms. Weir and Laing (2003) and Alcalde and Espitia (2003) found 
that acquired firms had a higher return on assets, although the result is not statistically 
significant. Cudd and Duggal (2000) found that the return on equity was 
significantly positively related to the probability of acquisition. This result may 
reflect another competing hypothesis that higher return on asset reflects higher 
profitability of the targets, therefore leading to a higher probability of being acquired. 
Return on asset is therefore included in this thesis to reflect its importance on outward 
FDI decision. 
- Price-Earnings Ratio of the Target Firm 
The Price-earnings hypothesis states that firms with high price-earnings (P/E) 
ratios will experience immediate gains from acquiring firms with low P/E due to the 
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market's tendency to value the combined firm at the acquirer's original high 
price-earnings ratio (Palepu, 1986). Although Cudd and Duggal (2000) found 
price-earnings hypothesis was not supported in their studies, Price-earnings ratio is 
still included in this thesis as the hypothesis is logical. 
Non-financial Control Variables 
Dummy Variable for same SIC 
Firms are likely to impose discipline on the acquired firms with related business 
than on those with unrelated business. This relatedness affects the potential 
synergistic benefits (Scanlon, Trifts and Pettway, 1989). Those potential benefits 
encourage the firms to impose discipline on the acquired firms in a related business. 
An unrelated partial acquisition is expected to result in little or no synergistic gain due 
to non-operational synergies (Lewellen , 1971), so that the firms would have less 
interest or ability in imposing control on an unrelated acquired firms. Alcalde and 
Espitia (2003) showed that the business relatedness was positively related to the long 
term performance of the acquired firms. Therefore, business relatedness is included 
in this thesis to reflect its effect in outward FDI decision. 
Number of Product Segments of the Target Firm 
Firms with a larger number of product segments are always those with a 
'conglomerate' structure. This kind of structure is always a bulky one and may 
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discourage the acquirer from buying the whole firm. Therefore, it is believed that 
firms with a larger number of product segments will be less likely to be the targets of 
acquisition. There will be a higher chance for a US firm to set up JV with the 
conglomerates. 
In addition to the control variables discussed above, we also control for some 
years which report particularly large number of M&A or JV transactions. These 
years are year 1998, year 1999 and year 2000 for M&A transactions and year 1995 for 
JV transactions. By controlling these years, we can have a fair investigation for the 
ownership proportion decision. 
Design of Regression Models 
We decompose the study of outward FDI into the investigation of investment 
mode choice and ownership proportion selection by forming different samples. In 
order to achieve this, we developed different empirical regression models. Before 
going on, the flow chart previously appeared in the introduction part should give 
better insights and ideas on the model design. 
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Firm planning to invest abroad 
Sole owner of the foreign invested entity Co-owner of the foreign invested entity 
(1) (2) 
Buy an existing Set up a WOE Buy a portion of Set up a 
foreign firm an existing firm JV with 
(100% acquisition) (<100% acquisition) foreign firms 
(3) (4) (5) (6) 
For studying the investment mode selection, we can first control the proportion 
owned by the US firms, that is, adopting the sample of full ownership or partial 
ownership (1 or 2). However, since the data for WOE (4) are not available, we are 
able to carry out the study by using partial ownership only (2). Therefore, the first 
model investigates the investment mode selection between M&A and JV by forming a 
sample with partial M&A and JV transactions only (5 VS 6). Secondly, we are now 
going to investigate the ownership proportion selection. By the same token, we can 
use the sample of greenfield start-up or M&A. For the greenfield start-up, since the 
data for WOE are not available (4)，we can use the sample of JV only (6). Therefore, 
the second model investigates the ownership proportion selection by forming a sample 
with JV transactions only (6). We can then easily form the third model to investigate 
the ownership proportion selection by forming a sample with M&A transaction only 
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(3 + 5) . 
Methodology 
There are two questions investigated in this research. The first question is what 
investment mode is chosen by the US firms when investing in other countries given a 
particular ownership proportion^. The dependent variable in this regression model is 
M&A or JV. Since the dependent variable is dichotomous, ordinary linear regression 
is considered inappropriate in this model. We therefore adopt binomial logistic 
regression model for this question. 
The second question is what ownership proportion is chosen by the US firms 
when investing in other countries given a particular investment mode^ For the 
sample of M&A transactions, the dependent variable is full M&A, majority M&A or 
minority M&A. For the sample of JV transactions, the dependent variable is 
majority JV, equal-share JV or minority JV. Since the dependent variables in these 
two samples are no longer dichotomous, ordered logistic regression is adopted for 
these two samples. 
:Sample of partial M&A and JV transactions 
Sample of M&A transactions and sample of JV transactions are used separately 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE EFFECTS OF LEGAL FACTORS ON INVESTMENT MODE 
SELECTION 
Rationale for the Study 
The literature review in the previous chapter highlights the fundamental theories 
on the choice of entry mode and some important empirical results. This paper puts 
emphasis on the effect of the legal factors on the choice of entry mode. In order to 
have more detailed analytical insights, I decompose the choice of entry mode into the 
choice of investment mode and the choice of ownership proportion. 
Economics is the study of behavior of constrained maximization by human 
beings. The constraints can be of all kinds. People (economic agents) are always 
maximizing their utility under the specified constraints. In the thesis, we would like 
to investigate how the legal constraints influence the choice of entry mode in outward 
FDI. 
Legal regulations define the rules of game that must be observed by the 
economic agents. There is no doubt that for most of the countries, legal environment 
has a significant impact on the ways of living of the people. More importantly, for 
those firms that would like to enter other countries for foreign direct investment, legal 
situation of a country must be considered thoroughly by the firms. As the United 
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States is a country with a strong rule of law, we believe that legal factors must have a 
significant effect for the firms from the US than those from other nations ^ 
Therefore, choosing the US firms as the subject of this paper is without doubts. 
In this chapter, we will first investigate the effect of legal factors on the 
investment mode selection, which is the binary choice between partial M&A and JV. 
The effects of legal factors on the ownership proportion selection will be given in the 
immediately following chapter. For both chapters, hypotheses are grouped 
according to the nature of the legal determinants, followed by empirical evidence. 
Fundamental Differences between Partial Acquisition and JV 
As we discussed in the introduction section, we see that although the firms can 
achieve the same ownership proportion in the cases of partial acquisition and JV, there 
are many fundamental differences between partial acquisition and JV. 
Partial ownership includes joint ventures and entities acquired through partial 
M&A. Joint venture is defined as the pooling of assets of two or more firms in a 
common and separate organization (Chang and Rosenzweig, 2001, p.748). Full 
ownership includes wholly owned enterprises set up by greenfield investment and 
those acquired by full M&A. Greenfield investments refer to those entities set up 
directly by foreign firms. It offers the greatest control over the local affiliate, yet 
5 In the US, there is regulation restricting the US firms to give bribe to the foreign government officials 
when investing abroad. 
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often requires the longest time to establish, and requires the greatest contribution of 
know-how (Chang and Rosenzweig, 2001, p.748). Acquisition offers the fastest 
means of building a sizable presence in a foreign market, yet is fraught with risks of 
overpayment, inability to fully assess the value of acquired assets, and 
post-acquisition challenges including cross-cultural integration (Chang and 
Rosenzweig, 2001, p.748). On the other hand, JV often involves new contracting 
and new company charters which can better protect new acquirer's interest. 
There is an increasing consensus of the certain advantages of acquisitions over 
geenfield start-ups (Brouthers and Brouthers, 2000; Chang and Rosenzweig, 2001). 
From the aspect of market access, acquisition enables firms to have access to the 
existing market coverage (Chang & Rbsenzweig, 2001). By contrast, it takes time 
for greenfield start-ups to build up the market capability from scratch. In view of the 
speed of entering a foreign country, acquisition also offers an effective market entry. 
As greenfield start-ups need to set up new organizations, and build up new market 
capabilities from scratch (Simmonds, 1990)，the process of setting up a JV is a long 
period. As acquisition is to buy an existing entity, the need to build up the enterprise 
culture, management style and the business network is very small. By contrast, 
greenfield start-ups may indulge much time in building up enterprise culture, 
management style and business network. The cost of setting up everything from 
31 
scratch is often larger than acquiring an exiting enterprise, even if we ignore the cost 
of lost market opportunities. 
Entering a foreign country can sometimes provide golden opportunities to leam 
from other firms. While greenfield start-ups develop on their own core 
competencies, buying an existing enterprise enables firms to get access to the 
technology and know-how that are not easy to generate internally (Berkema and 
Vermeulen, 1998). 
On the other hand, some of the advantages of acquisitions are controversial. 
Although we say that quick market access, speediness to set up and access to new 
technology are advantages for adopting M&A, whether they can access to a good 
market or leam good technology is under doubts. If everything in the target firms is 
good, of course, the quick access to those good qualities is attractive. However, if 
the enterprise culture and management style are bad, acquiring these firms will be 
poisons. Vermeulen and Barkema (2001) proposed that firms become used to their 
standard way of doing business, more complacent, and less alert to new ideas and 
innovations. Nelson and Winter (1982) also said that the ability of firms to make 
adaptations in foreign markets was reduced due to strong forces of inertia within 
organizations. Therefore, we can see that whether a firm adopts M&A or JV as 
investment mode to enter other countries depends on the qualities of the firms. On 
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the contrary, if the qualities of management of the firms are not good, the acquiring 
firms can increase their ownership in the target firms so as to increase its influence in 
the target firms. Unfortunately, not all the problems can be solved by owning more 
shares of the target firms. This is to say the internal business environment such as 
corporate governance problems (firm-level situation) can be more or less solved while 
some other undesirable conditions cannot be solved. These undesirable conditions 
include the legal institutional factors (country-level situation) in a country. 
Importance of Legal Institutions in the Choice of M&A and JV 
Laws and regulations are made by the governments and can be considered as 
exogenous variables in the investment mode decision. Economic agents observe 
laws and regulations and make their decisions to maximize their benefits under these 
legal constraints. If a country is of good legal institution and investor-friendly 
business environment, firms are more likely to invest in this country and set up a 
business in this country as soon as possible. The firms would like to have a quick 
access to the local markets and start to conduct business in this country. However, if 
this country has weak public governance and poor shareholder protection, the firms 
may consider the investment in this country riskier and may need more time to 
consider. They may still want to conduct business in this country but they will not 
invest in this country as promptly as in a good-law country. The firms would like to 
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have a local partner to help them conduct business in this country. The firms would 
also like to have their influence in the management of the local firms. Therefore, 
joint ventures, which offer them local partners and more influential power in the new 
local firms, will be the choice for the US firms to invest in weak-law countries. 
Investing through JV, US firms can set up a new entity from scratch and write the 
company charters with the local partners (Bai, Tao and Wu, 2004). 
According to the nature of the legal factors, they are classified into six categories, 
including legal origins, shareholder protection, government enforcement efficiency, 
securities regulation, corporate transparency and other legal issues. We will discuss 
these five categories and their component factors in the following sections. 
Hypothesis on the Effects of Legal Factors on Investment Mode Selection 
Hypothesis on Legal Origin 
Although no two nations adopt exactly the same laws, comparative legal scholars 
agree that legal systems in some nations are sufficiently similar in some aspects to 
allow the categorization of legal systems into different families. Legal scholars 
agree on some criteria to classify the legal families. These criteria are “1) historical 
background and development of the legal system; 2) theories and hierarchies of 
sources of law; 3) the working methodology of jurists within the legal systems; 4) the 
characteristics of legal concepts employed by the system" (Glendon, Mary, Michael 
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and Christopher, 1992, 00. 4-5). Based on these criteria, legal scholars identified 
two broad legal traditions: common law and civil law, which are important 
determinants in this paper. 
Choosing legal rules as explanatory variable is argued to be problematic by some 
scholars because the legal rules can be opted out in some countries (Easterbrook and 
Fischel, 1991). Practically, it may be too costly to opt out the standard legal rules. 
For this reason, standard rules show some binding power in decision-making 
processes (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998). Even the rules 
are binding enough to be included in the analysis, it may have been endogenously 
adjusted in economic reality. However, countries typically adopted their legal 
systems involuntarily by being conquered or colonized. The legal family can 
therefore be treated as a purely exogenous factor in the analysis (La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998). If it is found that the entry mode 
selection is associated with the different legal systems, it is believed that legal 
families affect the entry mode choice. 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) showed that countries 
adopting common law system protect minority shareholders better than do countries 
adopting civil law system. As common law system protects the investors (including 
foreign direct investors) better, I believe that the US firms prefer low-control mode 
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(M&A investment). It is hypothesized that: 
Hypothesis 1.1: Firms prefer M&A as investment mode when entering countries with 
investor-friendly legal origins. English common law should have the highest chance 
to receive M&A, followed by Scandinavian law, German law and French law. 
Hypothesis on Shareholder Protection 
The degree of shareholder protection is always the key factor for the success in 
the investment policy in a country. Legal system in common law countries is 
investor-friendlier (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998), which 
can be treated as implicit forms of shareholder protection, however, explicit 
shareholder protection stated in legal regulations is also important. As suggested by 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), shareholder rights are 
considered with regard to their power to vote for directors during the voting 
procedures. These include voting rights attached to shares, rights that support the 
voting mechanism against interference by the insiders (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998). Grossman and Hart (1988) and Harris and Raviv (1988) 
suggested that investors may be better protected if the dividend rights are linked to 
voting rights. That means companies are subject to one-share-one-vote rules. The 
underlying idea is that, insiders cannot appropriate cash flows to themselves by 
controlling a small share of the company's cash flows but still maintaining voting 
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control (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998). It must be noticed 
that there are many ways out of the one-share-one-vote principle that countries can 
accommodate in laws. For example, companies can issue non-voting shares, low 
and high-voting shares, founders' shares with extremely high voting rights, or shares 
whose votes increase when they are held longer, as in France. In addition, 
companies can also restrict the number the votes that shareholders can exercise at a 
shareholders' meeting, regardless of how many votes he controls. La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) took notice on these issues and said 
that a country has one-share-one-vote if none of these practices is allowed by law. 
In addition to the one-share-one-vote policy, anti-director right is also used to 
measure how strongly the legal system favors shareholders (against managers) in the 
voting process. The better anti-director right is said to exist when 1) shareholders 
can vote by mail, which is easier for them to vote, 2) law requires that shareholders 
deposit their shares with the company or a financial intermediary several days prior to 
a shareholder meeting (this practice prevents the shareholders from selling their shares 
prior to the meeting, therefore keeps those who do not bother to go to the meeting for 
this exercise), 3) - countries allow cumulative voting for directors, which gives 
minority shareholders more power to vote for their representatives as directors, 4) 
countries give minority shareholders legal mechanisms to be used against perceived 
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oppression by directors, 5) countries allow relatively lower percentage of share capital 
needed to call an extraordinary shareholders' meeting. 
Mandatory dividend policy is also a factor to measure the shareholder protection. 
It is a bit different from the other measures. In some countries, companies are 
mandated to pay out a fraction of their earnings as dividends. This practice is to 
prevent the companies from manipulating the earnings to raise additional capital 
funds. 
Rossi and Volpin (2003) suggested a shareholder protection measure, which is 
the product of the rule of law index and the anti-director right index and is then 
divided by 10. They argued that when minority shareholders have fewer rights, they 
are more likely to be expropriated. Therefore, with lower shareholder protection, the 
stock market is less developed. It makes raising external equity more expensive. 
They showed the positive association between shareholder protection and volume of 
M&A. The hypotheses for the few aspects in shareholder protection are as follows: 
Hypothesis 1.2: Firms prefer M&A as investment mode when entering countries with 
better shareholder protection as measured by 1) one-share-one-vote policy, 2) better 
anti-director right and 3) implementation of mandatory dividend policy. 
The underlying ideas behind the hypotheses above are that firms typically prefer 
low-control mode as entry mode when entering countries with better shareholder 
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protection. If the shareholder protection is not good, firms prefer high-control mode 
as entry mode (Luo, 2001). 
Hypothesis on the Government Enforcement Efficiency 
A strong legal system of legal enforcement may substitute for the weak legal 
rules, as the active and well-functioning courts can help protect investors abused by 
the management (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998). When 
investors finance firms, they must want to have some protections on their rights or 
powers through enforcement of law (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 
2000). Laws and regulations are enforced in part by market regulators, in part by 
courts, and in part by market participants themselves. Good legal enforcement 
enables investor rights such as the voting rights of the shareholders and the 
reorganization and liquidation rights of the creditors to be extensively and well 
enforced by regulators and courts. Therefore, investors are willing to finance firms. 
When legal system or legal enforcement does not work well, external financing will 
not work well as the outside investors are not well protected (La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 2000). La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, 
and Vishny (2000) demonstrated the rejection of the hypothesis that private 
contracting is sufficient. They showed that laws and regulations are more protective 
for investors even in countries with well functioning judiciaries. It means 
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government enforcement of law has a larger protective power than other forms of 
protection. 
In this paper, we will use three measures of government enforcement efficiency, 
namely, 1) efficiency of judicial system, 2) rule of law, 3) corruption index. These 
three measures are used by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) 
and are widely used by other studies concerning legal enforcement (Rossi and Volpin, 
2003). The three legal variables are incorporated to form a new index called 
government enforcement efficiency index by taking arithmetic mean. Besides, three 
legal factors that are considered to be more relevant to risk of conducting business are 
1) risk of expropriation, 2) the likelihood of contract repudiation by the government 
and 3) contract and law index. The government enforcement efficiency index is 
concerned about the enforcement of legal rules and the latter three suggest the 
government stance toward business. Some of these variables have also been 
previously shown to have effect on national growth rates (Keefer and Knack, 1995). 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) suggested that legal families 
with investor-friendlier laws (common law) are also the ones with stronger 
enforcement of law. It follows logically that investors would like to invest in 
countries with stronger enforcement of law, therefore, investors will choose 
low-control mode (M&A investment) when entering countries with better 
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enforcement of law. It can be hypothesized as follows: 
Hypothesis 1.3: Firms prefer M&A as investment mode when entering countries with 
higher government enforcement efficiency as measured by government enforcement 
efficiency index. 
Hypothesis 1.4: Firms prefer M&A as investment mode when entering countries with 
better legal protection for business environment as measured by 1) risk of 
expropriation, 2) the likelihood of contract repudiation by the government and 3) 
contract and law index. 
It is very clear to derive the above Hypothesis 1.3. However, for Hypothesis 
1.4，there are theories contrasting the hypotheses. In fact, a higher risk of 
expropriation and higher likelihood of contract repudiation by the government raise 
the legal environmental uncertainty as perceived by the US firms in FDI. Higher 
contract and legal risk should also have the same potential effects. Collis (1991) and 
Root (1994) suggested that local partners in a cooperative entry mode could help 
reduce vulnerability to contextual risks, promote the stability of venture activities and 
escalate a subsidiary's dynamic ability to run a business environment. Legal 
environmental uncertainty is of course one kind of environmental uncertainty. 
Therefore, Hypothesis 4 is indeed an empirical question. 
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Hypothesis on Securities Regulation 
The implementation of securities regulation is to provide a fair environment for 
the market participants. The better the securities regulation in a country is, the more 
confident the market players are in the country. Choosing M&A as investment mode 
relies greatly on the stock market in a country. Purchase price in acquisition is often 
set by or at least closely related to the stock market value. Better securities 
regulation helps protect the acquirers' interests. It is hypothesized as follows: 
Hypothesis 1.5: Firms prefer M&A as investment mode when entering countries with 
better securities regulation. 
Hypothesis on Accounting Standard and Corporate Transparency 
Accounting standard measures the quality of the disclosure of accounting 
information (Rossi and Volpin, 2003). When more accounting information is 
disclosed, the corporate transparency improves. For investors to know more about 
the firms, it is necessary to have a good accounting standard for the disclosure of 
accounting information. Accounting standard is necessary for financial contracting, 
especially if investor protection is weak (Hay, Shleifer and Vishny, 1996). 
This factor affects M&A activity, because good disclosure is a necessary 
condition for finding and identifying potential targets. Accounting standard can also 
reflect corporate governance, because it makes corporate accounts more transparent to 
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reduce the scope for expropriation, which is to protect the shareholders better. In 
addition to using accounting standard as the variable for corporate transparency, we 
also form a variable called corporate transparency index which is formed by taking 
arithmetic mean of disclosure requirement and accounting standard. The corporate 
transparency index should give a comprehensive measurement on the corporate 
transparency. It is hypothesized as follows: 
Hypothesis 1.6: Firms prefer M&A as investment mode when entering countries with 
better accounting standard and higher corporate transparency. 
Hypothesis on Other Legal Issues 
Apart from the legal aspects discussed above, there are some other relevant legal 
issues. In some countries, there are mandatory bid rule which is a legal requirement 
for the firms to make a tender offer when shareholding after the acquisitions exceeds a 
given ownership threshold. It might reduce the volume of M&A as it imposes extra 
costs on the potential bidders (Rossi and Volpin, 2003). It is hypothesized as follow: 
Hypothesis 1,7: Firms prefer M&A as investment mode when entering countries 
without mandatory bid rule. 
Cross-border regulation is a deterrent for cross border M&A activities. This 
regulation is said to exist if a foreign buyer needs government approval before 
acquiring control of a domestic firm. It is expected to have fewer cross-border deals 
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associated with more regulatory requirements (Rossi and Volpin, 2003). The 
hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 1.8: Firms prefer M&A as investment mode when entering countries 
without cross-border regulation. 
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Empirical Evidence for the Effects of Legal Factors on Investment Mode 
Selection 
The logistic regression specification employed is as follows: 
M&A orJV=f(X) + e 
where X can be legal origins, shareholder protection, government enforcement 
efficiency, securities regulation, corporate transparency or other legal issues 
(1) 
We investigate the legal determinants in the investment mode selection in this 
research. In order to control for the specific characteristics of the target firms (M&A) 
or partner firm (JV), we introduce the control variables in every regression. 
In order to have a detailed investigation of the investment mode selection, we 
have prepared four regression models. The first regression model adopts the sample 
of partial M&A and JV (sample 1); the second regression model adopts the same 
sample as the first regression model but has ex-post majority ownership controlled 
(sample 2). The third regression model contains the sample of majority M&A and 
majority JV only (sample 3). The fourth regression model contains the sample of 
minority M&A and-minority JV only (sample 4). 
Legal Origin 
(Insert Table 5 A here) 
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Table 5A reports the coefficients of the binomial logistic regression model 
derived from the specification (1) with sample 1. Column 2 shows the regression 
including the three legal origin dummy variables along with financial control 
variables^ and non-financial control variables?. French legal origin, German legal 
origin and Scandinavian legal origin are shown to be negative and significant. This 
means civil legal systems lead to a lower chance of adopting M&A as the investment 
mode. We further add the country-level control variables^ to the regression in 
column 3. The three legal origin dummy variables are still negative and significant. 
After we add the cultural control variables^ and the regional control variables'®, the 
three legal origin dummy variables are still negative and significant. Finally, we 
decompose the regional dummy variables into four continental regional dummy 
variables"，the three legal origin dummy variables are still negative and significant. 
(Insert Table 6A here) 
When we control for the ex-post majority o w n e r s h i p 12，the results are similar to 
those of the model without ex-post majority ownership dummy. Table 6A shows the 
coefficients of the three legal origin dummy variables. The coefficients are negative 
6 Return on asset, P/E (+), P/E dummy and total asset 
7 Number of product segments and dummy for same SIC 
8 Logarithm of GDP and external market capitalization/GDP 
9 Dummy for English-speaking Country, Christianity and protestants, and Christianity but not 
protestants 
…Dummy for same region 
‘‘Dummy for Europe, dummy for Asia, dummy for Africa and dummy for Australia 
12 Ex-post majority ownership dummy variable is added to control for the ownership proportion. We 
believe that the effects of the legal institutions in majority and minority are different. 
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and significant. 
(Insert Table 7A here) 
We split the sample into sample of majority M&A and JV (sample 3) and sample 
of minority M&A and JV (sample 4). In sample 3，when we add the financial 
variables and the non-financial variables, French legal origin and Scandinavian legal 
origin are shown to be negative and significant. However, German legal origin is not 
significant although it is still negative (column 1 and 2). When we add the cultural 
control variables and the regional control variables, all the three legal origin dummy 
variables are shown to be negative and significant (column 3 and 4). 
(Insert Table 8 A here) 
Table 8A shows the results of the regressions with minority sample. The three 
legal origin dummy variables are shown to be negative and significant in all the 
regressions with different control variables added. Column 1 shows the regression 
with financial control variables added. Column 2 shows the regression with 
country-level control variables. Column 3 and 4 show the regressions with cultural 
control variables and regional control variables. In conclusion, French legal origin, 
German legal origin and Scandinavian legal origin are always shown to be negative 
and significant. The above empirical findings support the hypothesis that countries 
with English legal origins have higher chance to be invested through M&A. 
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Shareholder Protection 
(Insert Table 5B here) 
In table 5B, column 1 shows the one-share-one-vote variable is negative and 
significant when the financial control variables and non-financial control variables are 
added (column 1). When we add country-level control variables to the regression, 
one-share-one-vote is still negative and significant (column 2). However, when we 
control for the cultural and regional proximity (column 3 and 4)，one-share-one-vote 
policy is shown to be insignificant. The results show that one-share-one-vote policy 
has unfavorable effect on M&A as investment mode selection. However, when we 
control for the cultural and regional proximity, the unfavorable effect on M&A as 
investment mode selection becomes insignificant. Anti-director right variable is 
always shown to be positive and significant when we add the financial control 
variables, non-financial control variables, country-level control variables and cultural 
and regional proximity variables. The favorable effect of anti-director right on 
investment mode towards M&A is expected as this reflects better shareholder 
protection. Mandatory dividend policy is shown to be negative but not significant 
when we add financial control variables and non-financial control variables only. 
When we further control for the country macroeconomic condition! 3 and cultural and 
13 Logarithm of GDP and external market capitalization / GDP 
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regional proximity, mandatory dividend policy becomes significant. These findings 
seem to disagree with our hypothesis. Due to the abnormal sign of 
one-share-one-vote variable, we do not find very strong evidence to support for the 
hypothesis on shareholder protection that better shareholder protection will increase 
the chance of investment by M&A mode. 
(Insert Table 6B here) 
Table 6B reports similar results as the previous model shown in Table 5B. The 
model controls for ex-post ownership proportion. We can see that when we control 
for the ex-post ownership proportion, the three shareholder protection variables still 
show similar results. Column 13 shows the regression with all the three shareholder 
protection variables added. We can see that anti-director right index is positive and 
significant while mandatory dividend policy is negative and significant. 
(Insert Table 7B) 
We split the sample into two samples-one with majority ownership and one with 
minority ownership. For the majority sample, only mandatory dividend policy is 
shown to be significant but it is still negative. One-share-one-vote policy and 
anti-director right index are insignificant. 
(Insert Table 8B here) 
In the minority sample, one-share-one-vote policy and anti-director right index 
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are significant. However, mandatory dividend policy is shown to be insignificant. 
When we run a regression with the three shareholder protection variables, only 
anti-director right index is significant (column 13). 
It is interesting to notice that in majority sample, mandatory dividend policy is 
significant while the others are not. In minority sample, one-share-one-vote policy 
and anti-director right index are significant but mandatory dividend policy is not. 
Government Enforcement Efficiency 
(Insert Table 5C here) 
Table 5C shows the coefficients of the variables of government enforcement 
efficiency. Column 1 shows that government enforcement efficiency index is 
positive and significant when we add the financial control variables ^^  and 
non-financial control variables ^^  only. When we control for the country 
macroeconomic condition and cultural and regional proximity, government 
enforcement efficiency index is still positive and significant (column 2 and 3). 
Column 4, 5 and 6 show that regressions of expropriation risk. Expropriation risk is 
shown to be positive and significant when financial control variables and 
non-financial control variables are added (column 4). When we control for the 
country macroeconomic condition and cultural and regional proximity, expropriation 
14 Return on asset, P/E (+), P/E dummy and total asset 
15 Number of product segments and dummy for same SIC 
16 Logarithm of GDP and external market capitalization/GDP 
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risk is also positive and significant (column 5 and 6). Repudiation risk shows the 
similar results as expropriation risk. Repudiation risk is also shown to be positive 
and significant in column 7, 8 and 9. Column 10 shows the regression of contract 
and law index with financial control variables and non-financial control variables 
added. Contract and law index is shown to be positive but insignificant. It is still 
insignificant when country macroeconomic condition and cultural and regional 
proximity are controlled. When we remove the government enforcement efficiency 
index from the regression in column 13，contract and law index becomes positive and 
significant. These results give empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that 
M&A is preferred for countries with higher government enforcement efficiency. 
(Insert Table 6C here) 
When we control for the ex-post majority ownership, the results are similar as 
those found for the last model. Government enforcement efficiency index is shown 
to be positive and significant (column 1, 2, 3 and 4). Expropriation risk is found to 
be insignificant when country control variables are added (column 5). When we 
add the control variables for cultural and regional proximity, expropriation risk 
becomes positive and significant again (column 6). Repudiation risk is always 
positive and significant with different sets of control variables added (column 7，8 and 
9). However, contract and law index is always insignificant with different sets of 
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control variables added (column 10, 11 and 12). 
(Insert Table 7C here) 
When we use the sample of majority M&A and JV, government enforcement 
efficiency index is shown to be positive and significant in the regression with 
financial control variables, non-fmancial control variables, country-level control 
variables and cultural and regional proximity added (column 3). Repudiation risk is 
shown to be positive and significant when financial control variables, non-fmancial 
control variables and country-level control variables are added (column 8). When 
cultural and regional control variables are added, repudiation risk becomes 
insignificant (column 9). Expropriation risk and contact and law index are never 
shown to be significant in this majority sample. 
(Insert Table 8C here) 
In Minority sample, only government enforcement efficiency index is significant. 
Expropriation risk, repudiation risk and contract and law index are insignificant. 
As a whole, we have strong evidence that higher government enforcement 
efficiency brings higher chances of M&A as an investment mode. 
Securities Regulation, Accounting Standard and Corporate Transparency 
• (Insert Table 5D here) 
Securities Regulation is not significant in the regression when financial control 
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variables, non-financial control variables and country-level control variables are 
added. When cultural and regional control variables are added, securities regulation 
is positive and significant (column 3 and 4). Accounting standard is positive and 
significant when different sets of control variables are added (column 5, 6, 7 and 8). 
Corporate transparency index is also positive and significant when different sets of 
variables are added (column 9，10, 11 and 12). The results support the hypotheses 
that better securities regulation, better accounting standard and higher corporate 
transparency lead to higher chances of M&A as investment mode. 
(Insert Table 6D here) 
When we control for the ex-post majority ownership, securities regulation, 
accounting standard and corporate transparency index are positive and significant in 
the regressions with different sets of control variables. 
(Insert Table 7D here) 
In majority sample, securities regulation, accounting standard and corporate 
transparency index are insignificant. 
(Insert Table 8D here) 
In minority sample, securities regulation, accounting standard and corporate 
transparency index are shown to be positive and significant again. The only 
exception is when cultural and regional proximity are added, corporate transparency 
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index becomes insignificant. 
The above findings show that in minority sample or in a sample controlling 
ex-post majority ownership, the variables are significant while in majority sample, the 
variables are not significant. This provides evidence that securities regulation, 
accounting standard and corporate transparency have stronger effect on investment 
mode selection in minority sample. The empirical results support the hypothesis that 
better securities regulation and higher corporate transparency in fact have favorable 
effect on M&A as investment mode. 
Other Legal Issues 
(Insert Table 5E here) 
Table 5E shows the coefficients of mandatory bid rule and cross-border 
regulation. Mandatory bid rule is shown to be positive and significant when 
different sets of control variables are added (column 1, 2，3 and 4). Cross-border 
regulation is shown to be negative and significant when different sets of control 
variables are added (column 5, 6, 7 and 8). The results for mandatory bid rule seem 
to contradict the hypothesis that firms prefer M&A as investment mode when entering 
countries without - mandatory bid rule. The results for cross-border regulation 
support the hypothesis. 
(Insert Table 6E here) 
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When we control for the ex-post majority ownership, mandatory bid rule is also 
positive and significant in regressions with different sets of control variables added 
(column 1，2 and 3). When we break down the regional control variables into 
detailed ones, mandatory bid rule becomes insignificant. Cross-border regulation is 
shown to be negative and significant. Similarly, when we break down the regional 
control variables into detailed ones, cross-border regulations is insignificant. 
(Insert Table 7E here) 
In majority M&A and JV sample, mandatory bid rule and cross-border regulation 
are no longer significant when different sets control variables are added. 
(Insert Table 8E here) 
In minority M&A and JV sample, mandatory bid rule is positive and significant 
(column 1，2 and 3). Cross-border regulation is shown to be negative and significant 
again (column 4, 5 and 6). 
Therefore, there is empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that 
implementation of cross-border regulation has a deterrent effect on choosing M&A as 
investment mode. On the contrary, there seem to be contradicting empirical 
evidence for the relationship between mandatory bid rule and investment mode 
selection. Mandatory bid rule is insignificant in majority sample but significant in 
minority sample. It seems that mandatory bid rule exerts impact on minority 
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investment only. The significance of mandatory bid rule in minority sample is not 
that meaningful as mandatory bid rule takes effect for investment which is larger than 
30%. The insignificance in majority sample suggests that there is no empirical 
evidence to support the hypothesis. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE EFFECTS OF LEGAL FACTORS ON OWNERSHIP 
PROPORTION DECISION 
Rationale for the Study 
In the previous chapter, we have discussed the hypotheses and the empirical 
results on the investment mode choice. We find that legal institutional factors in 
different aspects have substantial effects on the binary choice between partial M&A 
and JV. The main aim of the US firms to enter other countries is to maximize their 
business benefits for themselves. In order to obtain higher business interest in other 
countries, the US firms can increase their ownership proportions in the foreign entities. 
Their pursuit of higher ownership proportion may not be that straightforward as the 
appropriation to positive or negative residual income depends on many factors, some 
internal ones (corporate governance within the firm) and some external ones (legal 
institutions). 
Hypothesis on the Effects of Legal Factors on Ownership Proportion Decision 
A firm would like to have a greater stake in the foreign business in order to be 
entitled to more residual income. It may be too optimistic to stick to this bright side 
since the residual income can be negative, which is running a loss for the business. 
Therefore, whether a firm can enjoy greater profit or suffer greater loss depends on 
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the quality of the businesses. The quality of the businesses is only one of the factors 
influencing the sign and the magnitude of the residual income. Again, the legal 
institution also affects the businesses and the residual income in turn. In a weak-law 
country, the risk of conducting business is higher. Higher ownership proportion in a 
good business in a good-law country implies higher residual income while higher 
ownership proportion in a business in a weak-law country means higher potential 
losses. Since the legal institutional factors always define the rules of game a firm 
should follow when conducting businesses in a country, a firm cannot easily adopt 
any kinds of preventive measures to fight against the poor laws and regulations. 
Therefore, we can easily hypothesize that a good-law country will lead to a higher 
ownership proportion in both M&A and JV cases. We may call this hypothesis as 
‘Residual Income Hypothesis'. 
However, we may also have another direction of deduction. When US firms 
invest in weak-law countries, they may want to hold a higher ownership proportion in 
order to have a higher influential power in the firm. To the extreme, firms can hold a 
very high ownership proportion so that they can even bargain with the local 
government. In this regard, we may see US firms hold a higher ownership 
proportion in countries with poorer legal institutions. This hypothesis is referred 
'Fight-against Hypothesis' in this thesis. 
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We can see clearly that for the ownership proportion decision, there are two 
competing hypotheses, "Residual Income Hypothesis' and ‘Fight-against Hypothesis'. 
Therefore, whether 'Residual Income Hypothesis' or 'Fight-against Hypothesis' is 
dominant in ownership proportion decision remains an empirical question. 
The legal institutions will be measured in similar ways as in the last chapter. 
Details on the hypothesis on legal origin, shareholder protection, government 
enforcement efficiency, securities regulation, corporate transparency and other legal 
issues are given in the following. 
When 'Residual Income Hypothesis' is dominant, the hypotheses are as follows: 
Hypothesis on Legal Origin 
Hypothesis Firms tend to own a larger ownership proportion when entering 
countries with investor-friendly legal origin which is English common legal system. 
Hypothesis on Shareholder Protection 
Hypothesis 2.2: Firms tend to own a larger ownership proportion when entering 
countries with better shareholder protection as measured by 1) one-share-one-vote 
policy, 2) better anti-director right and 3) implementation of mandatory dividend 
policy. -
Hypothesis on Government Enforcement Efficiency 
Hypothesis 2.3: Firms tend to own a larger ownership proportion when entering 
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countries with higher government enforcement efficiency as measured by government 
enforcement efficiency index. 
Hypothesis 2.4: Firms tend to own a larger ownership proportion when entering 
countries with better legal protection for business environment as measured by 1) risk 
of expropriation, 2) the likelihood of contract repudiation by the government and 3) 
contract and law index. 
Hypothesis on Securities Regulation 
Hypothesis 2.5: Firms tend to own a larger ownership proportion when entering 
countries with better securities regulation. 
Hypothesis on Accounting Standard and Corporate Transparency 
Hypothesis 2.6: Firms tend to own a larger ownership proportion when entering 
countries with better accounting standard and higher corporate transparency. 
On the contrary, when 'Fight-against Hypothesis' is dominant, the hypotheses are 
as follows: 
Hypothesis on Legal Origin 
Hypothesis 3.1: Firms tend to own a smaller ownership proportion when entering 
countries with investor-friendly legal origin which is English common legal system. 
Hypothesis on Shareholder Protection 
Hypothesis 3.2: Firms tend to own a smaller ownership proportion when entering 
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countries with better shareholder protection as measured by 1) one-share-one-vote 
policy, 2) better anti-director right and 3) implementation of mandatory dividend 
policy. 
Hypothesis on Government Enforcement Efficiency 
Hypothesis 3,3: Firms tend to own a smaller ownership proportion when entering 
countries with higher government enforcement efficiency as measured by government 
enforcement efficiency index. 
Hypothesis 3.4: Firms tend to own a smaller ownership proportion when entering 
countries with better legal protection for business environment as measured by 1) Risk 
of Expropriation, 2) The likelihood of contract repudiation by the government and 3) 
contract and law index. 
Hypothesis on Securities Regulation 
Hypothesis 3.5: Firms tend to own a smaller ownership proportion when entering 
countries with better securities regulation. 
Hypothesis on Accounting Standard and Corporate Transparency 
Hypothesis 3.6: Finns tend to own a smaller ownership proportion when entering 
countries with better accounting standard and higher corporate transparency. 
Hypothesis on Other Legal Issues 
The effect of mandatory bid rule policy on the ownership proportion decision is 
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different from that of other legal institutional variables. The effect of mandatory bid 
rule policy is on the firms which would like to invest more than 30% in the entity only. 
For those firms investing less than 30%, mandatory bid rule is irrelevant. Therefore, 
we may see that when US firms enter a country with mandatory bid rule, they may 
want to invest in a smaller proportion so as to escape from this policy. It is 
hypothesized as follows: 
Hypothesis 5.7; Firms tend to own a larger ownership proportion when entering 
countries without mandatory bid rule. 
The main purpose of a country to adopt cross-border regulation is to control the 
amount of domestic entities owned by foreign investors. When US firms want to 
invest in a country with cross-border regulation, they may invest in a smaller 
proportion so that they can obtain the permission easier. It is hypothesized as 
follows: 
Hypothesis 3.8: Firms tend to own a larger ownership proportion when entering 
countries without cross-border regulation. 
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Empirical Evidence for the Effects of Legal Factors on Ownership Proportion 
Decision 
Full M&A or Majority M&A or Minority M&A =f (X) + e 
where X can be legal origin, shareholder protection, government enforcement 
efficiency, securities regulation, corporate transparency or other legal issues 
(2) 
Majority JV or Equal-share JV or Minority M&A =f (X) + £ 
where X can be legal origin, shareholder protection, government enforcement 
efficiency, securities regulation, corporate transparency or other legal issues 
� 
We investigate the legal determinants in the ownership proportion decision in 
this research. In order to control for the specific characteristics of the target firms 
(M&A) or partner firm (JV), we introduce the control variables in every regression. 
We investigate the ownership proportion decision in the M&A samples and JV 
samples. In the M&A sample, the dependent variable is full M&A, majority M&A 
or minority M&A，and ordered logistic regression is adopted. In the JV sample, the 
dependent variable is majority JV, equal-share JV or minority JV, and ordered logistic 
regression is also adopted. 
“ Legal Origin 
(Insert Table 9A here) 
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Column 1 shows the regression of legal origin variables with financial'^ and 
non-f inanc ia l 18 control variables added. Scandinavian legal origin is shown to be 
positive and significant while French legal origin and German legal origin are 
negative but not significant. When country-level control variables^^ are added to the 
regression, Scandinavian legal origin is also positive and significant (column 2). We 
then further control for the cultural and regional proximity, column 4 and 5 show that 
Scandinavian legal origin is still positive and significant while French and German 
legal origins are not significant. In the M&A sample, we add the industry-level 
control variables^®, year dummy variables^ ^  and target country dummy variables^^ to 
the regression. Scandinavian legal origin is still positive and significant while 
French and German legal origins are not. The positive sign and significance of 
Scandinavian legal origin seems to support the 'Fight-against Hypothesis' but the 
insignificance of French and German legal origins does not support the hypothesis 
well. Therefore, the effect of legal origins on ownership proportion decision is a 
little bit ambiguous. 
(Insert Table 1 OA here) 
17 Market-to-book Ratio, P/E (+) and P/E dummy 
18 Number of product segments and dummy for same SIC 
19 Logarithm of GDP and external market capitalization/GDP 
20 Business services dummy variable and oil, gas and petroleum refining dummy variable (industries 
with largest number of M&A transactions) 
21 year 1998 dummy variable, year 1999 dummy variable and year 2000 dummy variable (years with 
largest number of M&A transactions) 
22 Canada country dummy variable and UK country dummy variable (countries with largest number of 
M&A transactions) 
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In JV sample, all the three legal origin variables are insignificant no matter what 
control variables are added in the regression. The results suggest that legal origins 
are not significant in explaining the ownership proportion in JV sample. 
Shareholder Protection 
(Insert Table 9B here) 
In M&A sample, all the three shareholder protection variables are insignificant 
no matter what control variables are added in the regression. The results show that 
shareholder protection is statistically irrelevant to the ownership proportion selection. 
(Insert Table lOB here) 
One-share-one-vote policy is insignificant in the JV sample. When fmancial^^, 
non-financiaP and country-level control variables are added, anti-director right is 
positive and significant (column 5 and 6). When cultural and regional control 
variables are added, anti-director right variable is not significant. When 
industry-level control variables , year dummy variables and target country dummy 
variables are added, anti-director right variable is not significant (column 5 and 6). 
Mandatory dividend policy is not significant with different sets of control variables 
added (column 9； 10, 11 and 12). The significance of the positive coefficient of 
“ P / E (+), P/E dummy and total asset 
24 Number of product segments and dummy for same SIC 
25 Prepackaged software industry dummy variable and information retrieval services industry dummy 
variable (industries with largest number of JV transactions) 
26 Year 1995 dummy variable (year with largest number of JV transactions) 
27 Japan country dummy variable (country with largest number of JV transactions) 
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anti-director right variable in column 5 and 6 suggests that 'Residual Income 
Hypothesis' is supported for this variable. 
Government Enforcement Efficiency 
(Insert Table 9C here) 
In the M&A sample, government enforcement efficiency index is shown to be 
positive and significant when country macroeconomic control variables are added 
(column 2). Expropriation risk is positive and significant when financial, 
non-financial and country-level control variables are added (column 4 and 5). 
Repudiation risk is also positive and significant when financial, non-financial and 
country-level control variables are added (column 7 and 8). When cultural proximity 
is added to the regression, repudiation risk is still positive and significant (column 9). 
Contract and law index is not significant with different sets of control variables added 
(column 10 and 11). The positive sign and significance of government enforcement 
efficiency index, expropriation risk and repudiation risk suggest that 'Residual 
Income Hypothesis' is supported in government efficiency enforcement measurement. 
(Insert Table IOC here) 
In JV sample, government enforcement efficiency index is positive but 
insignificant when different sets of control variables are added (column 1, 2 and 3). 
When government enforcement efficiency index and expropriation risk are added to 
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the regression, government enforcement efficiency index becomes positive and 
significant (column 4 and 5). Expropriation risk is insignificant when cultural and 
regional proximity are controlled (column 6). When industry-level control variables, 
year dummy variables and target country dummy variables are added, expropriation 
risk becomes negative and significant (column 7). Repudiation risk is insignificant 
when different sets of control variables are added (column 8, 9 and 10). When 
financial, non-fmancial, country-level, cultural and regional control variables are 
added to the regression, contract and law index is shown to be positive and significant 
(column 10). The positive sign and significance of government enforcement 
efficiency index supports the 'Residual Income Hypothesis' while the negative sign 
and significance of expropriation risk and repudiation risk supports the 'Fight-against 
Hypothesis'. These interesting results suggest that US firms tend to increase their 
influences in the invested entity to fight against the local government by holding a 
larger ownership proportion in the entity. The government enforcement efficiency 
index and contract and law index are less likely to be affected by the US firms, 
therefore, US firms choose to escape from the weak legal institutions (owning lower 
proportion). 
Securities Regulation, Accounting Standard and Corporate Transparency 
(Insert Table 9D here) 
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In M&A sample, securities regulation is insignificant when different sets of 
control variables are added. Accounting standard is positive and significant when 
financial, non-financial, country-level, cultural and regional control variables are 
added (column 5, 6 and 7). Corporate transparency index is positive and significant 
when financial and non-financial control variables are added (column 8). When 
country-level control variables are added in the regression, corporate transparency 
index is still insignificant (column 9). We then control for the cultural and regional 
proximity and add the industry-level control variables, year dummy variables and 
target country dummy variables, corporate transparency index is still insignificant. 
The empirical results suggest that securities regulation is insignificant in explaining 
ownership proportion decision in M&A sample. 
(Insert Table lOD here) 
In JV sample, securities regulation, accounting standard and corporate 
transparency index are insignificant in all regressions with different sets of control 
variables added. The empirical results show that these three measurements are not 
significant in explaining the ownership proportion in JV sample. 
Other Legal Issues 
(Insert Table 9E here) 
In M&A sample, mandatory bid rule is insignificant when different sets of 
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control variables are added. Cross-border regulation is negative and significant 
when financial and non-financial control variables are added (column 5 and 6). 
When cultural and regional proximity are controlled, cross-border regulation becomes 
insignificant (column 7). When industry-level dummy, year dummy and target 
country dummy variables are added, cross-border regulation is negative and 
significant again. This supports the hypothesis that US firms tend to own smaller 
proportion when investing in a country with cross-border regulation. 
(Insert Table 1OE here) 
In JV sample, mandatory bid rule and cross-border regulation are insignificant in 
all regressions with different sets of control variables added. The empirical results 
suggest that mandatory bid rule and cross-border regulation are insignificant in 
explaining the ownership proportion decision in JV sample. 
6 9 
CHAPTER SIX 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
There are several important worthy points provided by this study. First of all, it 
provides new insights into international business expansion. Compared with the 
existing literature, this study is a more comprehensive one as we decompose the entry 
mode selection into investment mode choice (partial acquisition or JV) and ownership 
proportion decision (full, majority or minority in M&A sample and majority, 
equal-share or minority in JV sample). Another important point to note is that we 
investigate the entry mode selection from a legal perspective. We adopt the legal 
institutional variables suggested by La Porta, et al. (1998). The legal institutional 
variables are then categorized into five groups, namely, legal origin, shareholder 
protection, government enforcement efficiency, securities regulation, corporate 
transparency and other legal issues. To the best of our knowledge, this thesis should 
be the first empirical attempt to study international business expansion from a legal 
perspective. We adopt 'Residual Income Hypothesis' and 'Fight-against Hypothesis' 
in the study of ownership proportion decision so that we can understand the issue in a 
deeper way and we try to control different relevant variables which are proven to be 
significant in the literature. 
In the study of investment mode selection, the empirical results suggest that US 
7 0 
firms tend to choose M&A as investment mode if they enter a country with better 
legal institutional environment. Speaking alternatively, US firms tend to choose 
M&A as investment mode when they enter other countries with 1) English common 
legal origin, 2) better shareholder protection, 3) higher government enforcement 
efficiency, 4) better securities regulation and higher corporate transparency and 5) no 
mandatory bid rule and cross-border regulation. These findings agree with our 
hypotheses. 
We have competing hypotheses in the investigation of ownership proportion 
decision. In M&A sample, 'Residual Income Hypothesis' is supported in 
government enforcement efficiency, securities regulation and corporate transparency. 
In JV sample, 'Residual Income Hypothesis' is supported in ant-director right while 
'Fight-against Hypothesis' and 'Residual Income Hypothesis are found to co-exist in 
government enforcement efficiency measurement. 'Residual Income Hypothesis' is 
supported by government enforcement efficiency and contract and law index which 
measure the overall government efficiency. 'Fight-against Hypothesis' is supported 
by expropriation risk which measure the risk related to conducting business in a 
country. This finding suggests that the US firms tend to 'escape' from bad 
government by owning smaller proportion in the invested entity. However, they tend 
to increase their influential power in the country to fight against expropriation risk by 
71 
owning more in the invested entity. 
The dataset used in this study is a large dataset. This thesis provides some 
insights to those who would like to understand how legal institutional environment 
affects decision by the multinational enterprise. There are limitations to this study. 
We choose US as the investing country in this research. In order to make the thesis 
more fruitful, the potential exploited area in this research is to investigate the outward 
FDI by some other large economies such as Japan and Germany. Future work 
should go in this direction. 
7 2 
TABLE 




French Legal Origin A dummy variable that equals one if the origin of the 
Company Law is the French Civil Law. 
Source: La Porta, et al. (1998) 
German Legal Origin A dummy variable that equals one if the origin of the 
Company Law is the German Civil Law. 
Source: La Porta, et al. (1998) 
Scandinavian Legal Origin A dummy variable that equals one if the origin of the 
Company Law is the Scandinavian Civil Law. 
Source: La Porta, et al. (1998) 
Shareholder protection 
One-share-one-vote Policy A dummy variable that equals one if company law or 
commercial code of the country requires that ordinary 
shares carry one vote per share, and zero otherwise. 
Source: La Porta, et al. (1998) 
Anti-director Right An index (0 to 5) aggregating the shareholder rights. 
The index is formed by adding one when a) the country 
allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote; b) 
shareholders are not required to deposit their shares 
prior to the General shareholders' meeting; c) 
cumulative voting is allowed; d) an oppressed 
7 3 
minorities mechanism is in place; or e) when the 
minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a 
shareholder to call for an extraordinary shareholders' 
meeting is less than or equal to 10%. 
Source: La Porta, et al. (1998) 
Mandatory Dividend Policy A variable that equals the percentage of net income that 
the company law or commercial code requires firms to 
distribute as dividends among ordinary shareholders. 
It takes a value of zero for countries without such 
restriction. 
Source: La Porta, et al. (1998) 
Corporate Transparency 
Accounting Standard An index of the quality of accounting disclosure. It 
takes a value from 0 to 100，with higher value stating 
better accounting standards. 
Source：.La Porta, et al. (1998) 
Disclosure Requirements An index formed by taking simple average of (1) 
Prospect; (2) Compensation; (3) Shareholders; (4) 
Insider Ownership; (5) Contracts Irregular; (6) and 
Transactions. It takes a value from 0 to 10, with 
higher value stating better disclosure requirements. 
Source: La Porta, et al. (2004) 
Corporate Transparency An index formed by taking simple average of 
Index Disclosure Requirements and Rating on Accounting 
Standards. It takes a value from 0 to 50.5, with higher 
value stating higher corporate transparency. 
7 4 
Securities Regulation 
Disclosure Requirements An index formed by taking simple average of (1) 
Prospect; (2) Compensation; (3) Shareholders; (4) 
Insider Ownership; (5) Contracts Irregular; (6) and 
Transactions. It takes a value from 0 to 1，with higher 
value stating better disclosure requirements. 
Source: La Porta, et al. (2004) 
Liability Standard An index formed by taking simple average of (1) 
Liability Standard for the Issuer and its Directors; (2) 
Liability Standard for the Distributor; and (3) Liability 
Standard for the Accountant. It takes a value from 0 to 
1, with higher value stating better liability standard. 
Source: La Porta, et al. (2004) 
Public Enforcement An index formed by taking simple average of (1) 
Supervisor Characteristics Index; (2) Rule-making 
Power Index; (3) Investigative Powers Index; (4) 
Orders Index; and (5) Criminal Index. It takes a value 
from 0 to 1，with higher value stating better public 
enforcement. 
Source: La Porta, et al. (2004) 
Securities Regulation An index formed by taking simple average of 
Disclosure Requirements, Liability Standard, Public 
Enforcement. It takes value from 0 to 1，with higher 
value stating better securities regulation. 
“ 
Government Enforcement Efficiency 
Efficiency of An index from 0 to 10 representing investors' 
Judicial System assessments of conditions in the country in question. 
Source: La Porta, et al. (1998) 
75 
Rule of Law An index from 0 to 6 for the tradition of law and order. 
Source: La Porta, et al. (1998) 
Corruption Index An index from 0 to 6 representing the ICR's assessment 
of the corruption in government. 
Source: La Porta, et al. (1998) 
Government Enforcement An index formed by taking simple average of 
Efficiency Index Efficiency of Judicial System, Rule of Law and 
Corruption Index. It takes a value from 0 to 10, with 
higher value stating better government enforcement 
efficiency. 
Source: La Porta, et al. (1998) 
Risk of Expropriation An index from 0 to 10 representing the ICR's 
_ assessment of the risk of 'outright confiscation' or 
'forced nationalization'. 
Source: La Porta, et al. (1998) 
Risk of Repudiation of An index from 0 to 10 representing the ICR's 
Contracts by Government assessment of the 'risk of a modification in a contract 
taking the form of a repudiation, postponement, or 
scaling down' due to 'budget cutbacks, indigenization 
pressure, a change in government, or a change in 
government economic and social priorites，. 
Source: La Porta, et al. (1998) 
Contracts and Law Index An index from 0 to 10 compiled by The Growth 
Competitiveness Report to assess the legal environment 
in a country. 
Source: The Growth Competitiveness Report 
2003-2004, World Economic Forum 
7 6 
Other Legal Issues 
Mandatory Bid Rule A dummy variable that equals one if acquirers are 
forced to make a tender offer to all shareholders when 
passing a given ownership threshold, and zero 
otherwise. 
Source: Economist Intelligent Unit, Country Surveys, 
obtained from Stefano Rossi, Paolo Volpin (2003) 
Cross-border Regulation A dummy variable that equals one if foreign buyers 
need government approval, and zero otherwise. 
Source: Economist Intelligent Unit, Country Surveys, 




Logarithm of GDP A variable controlling for the size of the economy of a 
country. GDP used is PPP-adjusted for the period from 
1994-2003. 
Source: DataStream 
External Market A variable representing the stock market capitalization 
Capitalization / GDP held by small shareholders divided by GDP. 
Source: La Porta, et al. (2004) 
Dummy for A dummy that equals 1 if English is one of the official 
English-speaking Country languages of the country. 
„ Source: World Fact Book, Central Intelligence Agency, 
US 
Dummy for Christianity and A dummy that equals 1 if majority of the citizens of the 
Protestants country is Christian (Protestants) 
Source: World Fact Book, Central Intelligence Agency, 
US 
Dummy for Christianity A dummy that equals 1 if majority of the citizens of the 
but not Protestants country is Christian (excluding Protestants) 
Source: World Fact Book, Central Intelligence Agency, 
US 
Dummy for same Region A dummy that equals 1 if the target country is in the 
continent of America (North and South). 
Source: World Fact Book, Central Intelligence Agency, 
US 
Dummy for Europe A dummy that equals 1 if the target country is in the 
continent of Europe. 
Source: World Fact Book, Central Intelligence Agency, 
US 
7 8 
Dummy for Asia A dummy that equals 1 if the target country is in the 
continent of Asia. 
Source: World Fact Book, Central Intelligence Agency, 
US 
Dummy for Africa A dummy that equals 1 if the target country is in the 
continent of Africa. 
Source: World Fact Book, Central Intelligence Agency, 
US 
Dummy for Australia A dummy that equals 1 if the target country is in the 
continent of Australia. 
Source: World Fact Book, Central Intelligence Agency, 
US 
Dummy for Canada A dummy that equals 1 if the target country is in 
Canada which contains the largest number of M&A 
transactions. 
Source: WorldScope, Thompson Financial 
Dummy for UK A dummy that equals 1 if the target country is in the 
UK which contains the second largest number of M&A 
transactions. 
Source: WorldScope, Thompson Financial 
Dummy for Japan A dummy that equals 1 if the target country is in Japan 
which contains the largest number of JV transactions. 
Source: WorldScope, Thompson Financial 
Industry-level variables 
Business Services Industry A dummy variable that equals 1 if the target firm is 
from business service industry which contains the 
largest number of M&A transactions. 
Source: WorldScope, Thompson Financial 
7 9 
Oil, Gas and Petroleum A dummy variable that equals 1 if the target firm is 
Refining Industry from oil, gas and petroleum refining industry which 
contains the second largest number of M&A 
transactions. 
Source: WorldScope, Thompson Financial 
Information Retrieval A dummy variable that equals 1 if the target firm is 
Services Industry from information retrieval services industry which 
contains the largest number of JV transactions. 
Source: WorldScope, Thompson Financial 
Prepackaged Software A dummy variable that equals 1 if the target firm is 
Industry from information retrieval services industry which 
contains the second largest number of JV transactions. 
Source: WorldScope, Thompson Financial 
Firm-level variables 
Financial variables 
Market-to-book Ratio A financial ratio formed by dividing market price of the 
share by the book value price of the share. 
Source: WorldScope, Thompson Financial 
Return on Asset A financial ratio formed by dividing the EBIT by the 
total asset of the firm. 
Source: WorldScope, Thompson Financial •‘ 
Leverage Ratio A financial ratio formed by dividing the total asset by 
the common equity of the firm. 
Source: WorldScope, Thompson Financial 
Price-to-eamings Ratio A financial ratio formed by dividing market price of the 
by the EBIT of the share of the firm. 
Source: WorldScope, Thompson Financial 
8 0 
P/E (+) A variable list containing the observations with positive 
P/E only. 
Source: WorldScope, Thompson Financial 
P/E Dummy A dummy variable which equals 1 if the P/E of the firm 
is negative, 0 if the P/E is positive 
Source: WorldScope, Thompson Financial 
Total Asset A financial variable which equals the total asset of the 
firm 
Source: WorldScope, Thompson Financial 
Non-financial variables 
Number of A variable representing the number of product segments 
Product Segments of the target firm. It equals the number of secondary 
SICs of the target firm. 
Source: WorldScope, Thompson Financial 
Dummy for same SIC A dummy that equals 1 if the investing firm and the 
target firm are in the same industry (same primary SIC). 
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Appendix 1: Summary statistics of the variables used in investigation of investment mode selection 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
M&A=1，JV = 0 4649 0.569303 0.495368 0 1 
Majority二 1，Minority =0 4649 0.417385 0.493321 0 1 
French Legal Origin 4649 0.324197 0.468258 0 1 
German Legal Origin 4649 0.205168 0.403983 0 1 
Scandinavian Legal Origin 4649 0.174628 0.379797 0 1 
One-share-one-vote 4649 0.307753 0.461744 0 1 
Anti-director Right.. 4649 2.793265 1.14519 0 4 
Mandatory Dividend 4649 0.022083 0.09767 0 0.5 
Government Enforcement 4649 
8.323266 1.704252 2.88 10 
Efficiency Index 
Expropriation Risk 4649 9.05 1.029968 5.22 9.98 
Repudiation Risk 4649 8.671151 1.2492 4.68 9.98 
Contract and Law Index 4649 5.010697 0.781805 2.27 6.35 
Securities Regulation 4649 0.602944 0.197452 0.18 0.91 
Accounting Standard 4629 67.16653 8.129167 36 83 
Corporate Transparency 4649 33.53027 5.521944 0.5 41.79 
Mandatory Bid Rule 4649 0.545811 0.498092 0 1 
Cross-border Regulation 4649 0.328113 0.46971 0 1 
Market-to-book Ratio 1071 1.682074 4.202979 -21 73.53 
Return on Asset 1253 558522.4 1.98E+07 -365.36 7.00E+08 
Leverage Ratio 1264 5.975593 32.32225 -87.5595 909.0909 
P/E (+) 1093 22.9571 86.52606 0 2100 
P/E Dummy 1130 0.153982 0.361092 0 1 
Total Asset 1277 1.06E+10 4.96E+10 0 8.10E+11 
Number of Product Segments 980 3.468367 1.45551 1 5 
Same SIC 1277 0.126077 0.332066 0 1 
LN GDP 1277 26.22559 2.282579 21.58278 28.83068 
Market Capitalization 1266 160.1587 346.8248 0.004964 1002.19 
English-speaking Country 1277 0.443226 0.496961 0 1 
Christian and Protestants 1277 0.082224 0.274813 0 1 
Christian but not Protestants 1277 0.560689 0.496498 0 1 
Same Region 1277 0.218481 0.413377 0 1 
Europe 1277 0.314017 0.464305 0 1 
Asia 1277 0.370399 0.483101 0 1 
Africa 1277 0.006265 0.078932 0 1 
Australia 1277 0.090838 0.287491 0 1 
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Appendix 2: Summary statistics of the variables used in investigation of ownership proportion selection 
(M&A sample) 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Full M&A = 2’ 
Majority M&A = 1， 4284 1.127753 0.758535 0 2 
Minority M&A = 0 
French Legal Origin 4284 0.190308 0.392717 0 1 
German Legal Origin 4284 0.140969 0.348143 0 1 
Scandinavian Legal Origin 4284 0.057269 0.232458 0 1 
One-share-one-vote 4284 0.139207 0.346315 0 1 
Anti-director Right 4284 3.131278 1.149894 0 4 
Mandatory Dividend 4284 0.017489 0.087213 0 0.5 
Government Enforcement 4284 
8.766741 1.453547 2.88 10 
Efficiency Index 
Expropriation Risk 4284 9.256978 0.920518 5.22 9.98 
Repudiation Risk 4284 8.863568 1.092926 4.68 9.98 
Contract and Law Index 4284 5.194511 0.734627 2.27 6.35 
4284 
Securities Regulation 4284 0.660899 0.202615 0.18 0.91 
Accounting Standard 4223 70.17469 8.407325 36 83 
Corporate Transparency 4284 35.06509 5.627556 0.5 41.79 
4284 
Mandatory Bid Rule 4284 0.692511 0.461657 0 1 
Cross-border Regulation 4284 0.140088 0.347231 0 1 
Market-to-book Ratio 847 1.991178 5.362203 -21 60.8 
Return on Asset 1135 0.054204 0.935991 -8.34 20.53 
Leverage Ratio 1124 4.988907 35.39017 -287.5 807.2936 
P/E (+) 864 20.91863 124.3519 0 2100 
P/E Dummy 864 0.126157 0.332219 0 1 
Total Asset 1135 2.99E+09 2.54E+10 100000 7.71E+11 
Number of Product 585 2.964103 1.399759 1 5 
Segments 
Same SIC 1135 0.228194 0.419853 0 1 
LNGDP 1135 26.83455 1.878833 21.58278 28.83068 
Market Capitalization 1135 69.5764 227.2373 0.004964 1002.19 
English-speaking Country 1135 0.591189 0.491831 0 1 
Christian and Protestants 1135 0.071366 0.257548 0 1 
Christian but not Protestants 1135 0.761234 0.426518 0 1 
Same Region 1135 0.293392 0.455517 0 1 
Europe 1135 0.439648 0.496563 0 1 
Asia 1135 0.176212 0.381168 0 1 
Africa 1135 0.003524 0.059287 0 1 
Australia 1135 0.087225 0.282288 0 1 
Business Services Industry 1135 0.104846 0.30649 0 1 
Oil, Gas and Petroleum 
1135 0.078414 0.268941 0 1 
Refining Industry 
Year 1998 1135 0.131278 0.337853 0 1 
Year 1999 1135 0.128634 0.334942 0 1 
Year 2000 1135 0.131278 0.337853 0 1 
Canada Country Dummy 1135 0.229075 0.420423 0 1 
UK Country Dummy 1135 0.197357 0.398179 0 1 
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Appendix 3: Summary statistics of the variables used in investigation of ownership proportion selection (JV 
sample) 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Majority JV = 2， 
Equal-share JV= 1， 1536 0.989091 0.512031 0 2 
Minority JV =0 
French Legal Origin 1536 0.227273 0.419452 0 1 
German Legal Origin 1536 0.334546 0.472261 0 1 
Scandinavian Legal Origin 1536 0.016364 0.126985 0 1 
One-share-one-vote 1536 0.456364 0.498546 0 1 
Anti-director Right _  1536 2.64 1.05644 0 4 
Mandatory Dividend 1536 0.017546 0.087914 0 0.5 
Government Enforcement 1536 
8.126691 1.755121 2.88 10 
Efficiency Index 
Expropriation Risk 1536 8.994164 1.002624 5.22 9.98 
Repudiation Risk 1536 8.646127 1.262825 4.8 9.98 
Contract and Law Index 1536 4.887673 0.717642 2.27 6.35 
Securities Regulation 1536 0.577491 0.179786 0.21 0.91 
Accounting Standard 1510 65.88007 6.77213 40 83 
Corporate Transparency 1536 32.83266 5.192367 0.5 41.79 
Mandatory Bid Rule 1536 0.452727 0.498213 0 1 
Cross-border Regulation 1536 0.490909 0.500372 0 1 
Market-to-book Ratio 517 2.286325 4.037294 -10.93 73.53 
Return on Asset 526 1330472 3.05E+07 -365.36 7.00E+08 
Leverage Ratio 547 7.29119 39.54913 -34.3643 909.0909 
P/E (+) 513 35.06528 79.70308 0 1219.51 
P/E Dummy 550 0.221818 0.415848 0 1 
Total Asset 550 1.93E+10 6.58E+10 0 8.10E+11 
Number of Product 
550 3.756364 1.425345 1 5 
Segments 
Same SIC 550 0.058182 0.2343 0 1 
LN GDP 550 25.80546 2.489956 21.58278 28.83068 
Market Capitalization 545 246.9024 418.6259 0.004964 1002.19 
English-speaking Country 550 0.376364 0.484914 0 1 
Christian and Protestants 550 0.070909 0.256907 0 1 
Christian but not Protestants 550 0.398182 0.489969 0 1 
Same Region 550 0.167273 0.373559 0 1 
Europe 550 0.214546 0.41088 0 1 
Asia 550 0.543636 0.498546 0 1 
Africa 550 0.009091 0.094998 0 1 
Australia , 550 0.065455 0.247551 0 1 
Prepackaged Software 
550 0.045455 0.208489 0 1 
Industry 
Information Retrieval 
550 0.052727 0.223692 0 1 
Services Industry 
Year 1995 550 0.254546 0.436002 0 1 
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